Happiness studies have rekindled interest in the measurement of subjective well-being, and often claim to track faithfully 'what people care about' in their lives. It is argued in this article that seeking to respect individuals' preferences in the context of making intrapersonal and interpersonal comparisons for social evaluation has important and somewhat surprising implications, which shed light, in particular, on subjective measures and their objective alternatives, such as Sen's capability approach. Four points are made. First, raw subjective well-being scores are problematic because they involve different calibration norms for different individuals or for the same individuals at different times. Moneymetric and similar measures appear more attractive in this perspective. Second, if individuals genuinely care about their relative positions, incorporating such relative aspects in the evaluation of individual situations does not necessarily lead to rewarding the selfish and malevolent. Third, in the context of risk, relying on ex ante preferences may clash with a concern for ex post preferences, which are better informed. Fourth, focusing on opportunities or capabilities may fail to respect preferences.
Introduction
Welfare economics and political philosophy are full of debates about how to measure individual well-being and make interpersonal comparisons, for the purpose of social evaluation. A central divide opposes objective-list approaches to theories favoring tradition in welfare analysis to ignore other-regarding feelings in order to avoid penalizing the altruist to the benefit of the selfish or the envious. Is there a danger in abandoning this rule and accommodating people's concern for their relative position?
Another difficult issue has to do with risk. It is standard in economics to look at risky prospects from the point of view of the expected utilities of the individuals. The normative analysis of public policies in risky contexts almost always consists in looking at their impact on ex ante well-being. It seems, in particular, natural to say that if one wants to respect people's preferences, this involves respecting their preferences over risk. There is, however, a debate about the alternative approach of looking at the ex post distribution of well-being. 6 Survey data typically provide something closer to the ex post distribution, but if questions are asked about the future, people will give their ex ante perspective.
Finally, and coming back to the debate on welfarism, there is an alternative line of answer to the question of measuring well-being in a way that respects what people care about. It is exemplified especially by Sen's theory. The capabilities approach is indeed meant to respect people's perspectives on life. Instead of asking them how they feel, it seeks to provide them with opportunities which they can use as they wish.
7 Moreover, the way in which opportunities would be evaluated and devised would involve democratic deliberation in which people could express and revise their priorities in life. It would also rely on the 'intersection principle', according to which when all personal preferences in the population agree that one individual situation is better than another one, then it is definitely better.
In a nutshell, this article examines the implications of measuring well-being in a way that respects people's concerns about their own lives. The next section briefly covers preliminary questions about the method. Then the following sections successively examine the subjective versus objective issue, the introduction of relative positions in the measure, the ex ante versus ex post debate, and the capabilities alternative. Finally, the last section makes the point that trying to respect individual preferences does not suffice to give precise guidelines about the measurement of well-being, and that fairness considerations about the distribution appear to be an essential part of the picture.
The argument will be as constructive as possible, with examples of sensible measures of well-being. But the general outlook of the argument is that these issues are more complex than is apparent, and that many popular answers to these questions must be reconsidered. A subjective indicator may not guarantee respect for people's perspectives, because people may care about objective outcomes; recording people's concern with their relative position does not necessarily introduce systematic biases in favor of the evil-minded; people's ex ante perspectives may not reflect their concerns, because they typically care about the final outcomes and relevant statistical information may improve on their personal perspective; focusing on opportunities may not be the best way to respect preferences, because people may care about achievements; the intersection principle is problematic because it makes it impossible to accommodate the diversity of individual preferences. As a consequence, satisfaction indicators and capabilities indexes are not the best measures if one wants to follow people's concerns. Better measures are conceivable, and are examined here. 
Preliminaries
In this article, I explore the consequences of seeking to respect what people want for themselves when addressing four questions about the measurement of well-being. Subjective or objective? Self-centered or not? Ex ante or ex post? Opportunities or achievements? This is not an empirical investigation. The idea is not to ask what people think about the philosophical debates concerning the measuring of well-being. The empirical investigation of people's opinions about ethical issues is a fascinating topic that has great relevance for the political success of particular ethical theories. For instance, people do have political opinions about whether it is fair to seek equality of opportunity rather than equality of outcome. But this is not the question examined here. The purpose of this article is to ask what happens, in a theoretical inquiry about interpersonal comparisons, when one seeks to measure individual well-being in a way that is as faithful as possible to what the individuals concerned want for themselves in their own lives. Is it more respectful of what people want for themselves to use their answer to a happiness question or to rely on a more objective set of data? Is it likewise more respectful to focus on their achievements rather than on their opportunities or on their ex ante preferences rather than on the ex post situation or on their strictly personal situation rather than on a broader situation involving others? It must be emphasized that although the measurement of well-being is the focus of this article, the context of this questioning is not the pure theory of the individual good. Rather, it is the problem of social evaluation, for which the measurement of well-being is an essential input. This concern for social evaluation will play an important role in this article, especially in the discussion of other-regarding preferences and in the last section that argues that fairness considerations are needed to fully specify interpersonal comparisons.
In this exploration, I adopt the working assumption that there exist individual preferences about personal life that are worth respecting. Of course, I do not believe that real people have unquestionable views about the good life and that policy-makers should always respect people's desires. Actually, I believe that people's values and preferences about the good life are very often questionable, because of a lack of education or wisdom or rationality. However, if people were always wrong about what is good for them the object of this article would be less relevant than if they were sometimes right. Fortunately, it is arguable that in many contexts it is not unreasonable to trust people's views on their own personal matters. Moreover, even if people are often wrong about their own good, it may be a matter of respect to let society be organized as if its members could be trusted on this matter. People have the right to make mistakes in their own lives when these are not too harmful. In this perspective, it is therefore interesting for the analyst to set aside his or her own views of the good life and to examine how one could follow people's views in the evaluation of their own situation.
At any rate, the objective of this article is not to defend the idea that people's priorities in their lives should be respected, but only to derive the implications of the assumption that they should be respected. The reason for focusing on this downstream question is that the debate on subjective versus objective measures of well-being, as well as the debates regarding the other questions, often involves the argument that a good measure is one that respects people's preferences.
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Politics, Philosophy & Economics 11(4) However, a clarification must be made about empirical possibilities. Although much of the article will sound critical about subjective measures and happiness data, the reader should not be misled into believing that happiness surveys are therefore deemed useless. In another article (Decancq et al., 2009) , my coauthors and I make constructive proposals about how to use happiness surveys in the elaboration of measures of well-being that respect individual preferences. Happiness surveys are not the only source of information about individual preferences, as one can also look at observed choices (revealed preferences) and at hypothetical choices elicited in specific questionnaires of stated preferences. Once preferences are estimated, it remains to feed them into suitable measures of well-being. The theoretical definition of such measures is the topic of the present article. The tone of the present article is therefore definitely on the constructive and positive side, as specific measures are advertised here.
To summarize, the present investigation about how to measure well-being and make interpersonal comparisons will completely ignore people's views about the theory of well-being, but will assume that what they want to have in their own lives should be respected by a good measure of well-being. There will be no terminological distinction in this article between individual values, priorities, goals, preferences, and 'what they care about'.
8 These terms will be used interchangeably and refer to what people want for themselves in their own life, not to their views about social justice or about the theory of interpersonal comparisons. I will be assuming not only that people's priorities and values are respectable, but that they induce consistent orderings of possible individual lives. This assumption may appear empirically questionable in view of the literature on inconsistent preferences.
9 Although this literature raises an interesting challenge, it appears exaggerated to derive from it that people do not have preferences at all, especially as regards their own situation (as opposed, perhaps, to distant issues such as nature preservation in remote places). From introspection, one should actually not be surprised that preferences exhibit some haziness in ordinary conditions. Consistent orderings, however, remain unscathed as a normative ideal. If one wants to live one's life in accordance with well-defined goals and priorities, a consistent ordering is the best tool for such a purpose. The fact that observed preferences are not up to the standard should, rather, lead us to explore what can be done empirically with the observable imperfect preferences, and what procedures are recommended to elicit preferences or even to help people form their own preferences in light of their deeper values. This interesting question will not be examined in this article.
Happiness and good emotions
The topic of this article is the construction of an interpersonally comparable measure of well-being that respects individual preferences about life, what people care about in their life and what they want for themselves. It stands to reason that respecting people's preferences and values in the measurement of well-being requires some information about their subjective perspective. But from this obvious fact one cannot deduce that an index of subjective well-being, derived from survey answers without precautions, is more respectful of individual evaluations than an objective indicator.
This point can be shown with a simple example. Suppose we learn that people care only about one thing in their life, which is described by a particular magnitude X. Suppose moreover that this magnitude X is not a mental state, but an objective state that is easily observed. To take a scholarly example, imagine a society of researchers who only care about their number of citations and evaluate their own lives accordingly. How should we proceed if we want to make an evaluation of individual and social situations that respects people's values?
Following some of the literature on happiness, we could try to measure people's emotions, their positive and negative feelings. Given that they care only about X, their emotions will be closely linked to what happens to X in their life. For instance, those who enjoy constant and unforeseen improvements in X will be constantly elated, while those who have repeated unforeseen disappointments will be constantly gloomy. This is due to the fact that, according to psychologists (for example, Kahneman, 1999) , emotions are triggered by events rather than by static situations. An individual with constant and very high level of X is likely to have less positive emotions than another individual with low expectations and a sequence of good surprises, even if the latter's level of X never reaches the former's.
Therefore, we can expect emotions to be an interesting source of information about what people care about and their achievements in X. But it is not necessarily the best source of information. As explained in the previous paragraph, comparing individuals in terms of happiness feelings may contradict their relative achievements in X. As they care about X, not about their own emotions, it is more respectful of their concerns and wishes in life to evaluate their situations in terms of X than in terms of emotions and feelings, even if the latter are influenced by the former.
If we leave the example and consider a more realistic case with individuals having a variety of goals in life, there is most probably a category of individuals who care mostly about their own emotions rather than any other mental state or objective state. For such individuals, it would indeed be respectful of their values and wishes to evaluate their situation in terms of emotions. But one cannot expect all individuals to have this narrow interest in personal emotions. As a matter of fact, even for such individuals who care only about their emotions, the great diversity of emotions raises a problem of aggregation already. Some may be mostly concerned with elation and excitement, others may seek peace of mind, and yet others may be especially afraid of certain episodes of anxiety. It is impossible for a single index of happiness to respect this diversity of perspectives. For those who have other interests, measuring their well-being on the basis of their flow of emotions will distort the evaluation in the way described above. Those with constant good surprises will have excellent emotional flows even if their situation is very modest. Such a measure of well-being will track changes rather than achievements.
10
One can imagine that there could exist another category of individuals who care about a variety of things, not just their emotions, but who are interested in change and progress in their own situation rather than in their achievement level. For such individuals, could a measure of emotions be a good proxy of their situation as they would wish it to be evaluated? If they really care about change, a constant level of change would trigger little emotion as this would be seen by them as a stable situation for the achievement of their objective. For them to see an emotion-arousing event, an acceleration of the pace of 420 Politics, Philosophy & Economics 11(4) progress would be needed. So, emotions track change for those who care about levels, acceleration for those who care about the speed of change, and so on. If it is the case (which is an empirical question) that emotions are more sensitive to events and good news than to stable levels of achievements, they can never serve as good proxies for the level of achievement of whatever the individuals care about. Moreover, there is a problem of calibration. Some individuals may be very sensitive and react a lot to changes in the achievement of their goals, while others may display equanimity and experience moderate emotions when facing big changes. It may therefore happen that the success or failure of one individual, in terms of progress in achieving her goals, is greater than another's although this does not show in her emotions.
In summary, a measure of emotions is unlikely to appear respectful of the values and goals of the category of individuals who care about other dimensions than emotions.
Satisfaction evaluations
An alternative measure of subjective well-being is satisfaction with life. Psychology distinguishes an important difference between cognitive aspects and affective aspects of subjective well-being (for example, Diener et al., 1999) . Satisfaction with life may pertain more to the former, if it corresponds to an evaluative judgment that the individual casts on her life. In contrast, the emotions discussed in the previous section fall under the affective side.
A significant part of the literature claims that there is not much difference between satisfaction and happiness responses in surveys, even when one deals with happiness questions that seem to track current or recent emotions and with satisfaction questions that deal with an evaluation of the whole life (for example, Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2006; Layard, 2005) . One must admit, unfortunately, that survey questions have not been conceived with the cognitive/affective distinction in mind. A question such as 'Taken all together, how would you say things are these days -would you say that you are very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy?' is actually very ambiguous because it can be understood as concerning happiness in life (that is, current emotions) or as concerning happiness with life (which is essentially an evaluative judgment of how 'things are'). Similarly, a satisfaction question such as 'All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?' is very ambiguous on one aspect. It could be about all the dimensions of the current slice of life ('these days') or about the whole life span ('your life as a whole') as viewed from the time of the survey. If it is the former, there will obviously be a strong correlation between current emotions and the evaluation of the current situation or, even more, recent life events. A good event (for example, the birth of a child) may boost one's emotions and one's satisfaction with one's recent life even if the effect on global satisfaction with the whole life span is more modest. It is therefore not too surprising that the literature often concludes that the determinants of answers to happiness and satisfaction questions are the same. There are, however, contributions showing significant differences between the two sorts of questions (for example, Kahneman and Deaton, 2010) . Now, let us come back to the X example, and assume again that individuals care only about the level of X in their life. Imagine that a good satisfaction survey is constructed Fleurbaey 421 that really tracks people's evaluative judgments about their whole life and is not distorted by recent events and emotions. Let us assume that the answers come in the form of a 0-10 range, as in ladder-of-life surveys. 11 Do the answers provide a measure of individual well-being that respects people's values? The problem is, here again, an issue of calibration. Even if the respondents are constrained to formulate their evaluation using the intervals 0-10, they may understand 0 and 10 differently and they may have different views about the values attached to the intermediate numbers.
A person with high expectations may give the value zero to the worst possible achievement she ever imagined having, but this may be greater than what another person imagines when thinking of a zero life. Moreover, the value of X that is assigned the grade zero in the ladder may change over life, as people revise their goals and expectations in light of what they have achieved. The same is even more likely to occur for grade 10, which must strongly depend of what is considered achievable. Imagine that the population of this example discovered a new technology that would allow them to double their X expectancy, that is, the value of X that they can hope to obtain. This would dramatically shift the value of X corresponding to 10, and would affect the whole calibration across the ladder.
Even for people who assign the same values of X to grades 0 and 10, the calibration of intermediate numbers may differ, in particular depending on how they distribute their initial expectations of achievements across the possible values of X. Someone who was optimistic about possible achievements and has been disappointed would give a low grade to medium values of X, whereas a pessimistic, but successful respondent would give a good grade to more modest achievements.
People's calibration would not only depend on their prior expectations, but also on their expectation about future achievements, if the value of X for their whole life is not yet fully determined. Differences in responses may then reflect different opinions about the future and not just different objective situations. This effect, however, need not be considered problematic if one considers that the best estimate of people's ultimate achievements is their own forecast. But this assumption is not reasonable when individual fates are highly correlated. Imagine that an individual who is pessimistic about the future climate and its repercussions on his own situation exhibits a low satisfaction score. Should we give him greater social priority, and possibly transfer resources in his direction, at the expense of someone who differs from him only by being more optimistic about the climate? Ultimately, both will share the same good or bad consequences of the evolution of the climate and whatever transfer has been done will appear ultimately unjustified. Letting the evaluation of their situation be influenced by their beliefs is a recipe for inconsistency of social policies.
Even more problematic is the fact that people's calibration would involve frames of reference that would rely on their own history and on the achievements of other people with whom they compare themselves. Coming from an aristocratic background may make even a pessimistic person unhappy with medium values of X, while a person with low-class origins may appreciate modest performances. Having successful relatives is bound to dampen the grade one attributes to one's own life.
in X achievements and diversity in calibrations. Additional perturbations may come from different cultures and different attitudes about displaying one's satisfaction. In some cultures it is encouraged to display pride and satisfaction, whereas in others humility and a low profile are valued, or self-deprecation and complaining about one's situation is customary. Such differences may also occur between social groups in the same culture.
Over the long run, due to shifting references one is likely to find that average satisfaction is roughly stable even if there has been great progress in X all over the society. This phenomenon is the essence of the famous Easterlin paradox, 13 but there is really nothing paradoxical about it. The adaptation of standards and references to the evolution of achievements is partly a cognitive phenomenon, corresponding to people focusing on what they consider likely in their life, and partly a convenient way of managing emotions. Indeed, good evaluations produce good feelings, so that adapting one's standards of evaluation to one's achievements is important for psychological health.
14 When dealing with emotions in the previous subsection, the possibility of finding individuals who care exclusively about their subjective well-being was considered. Can this be also possible when subjective well-being is measured in terms of satisfaction? It is true that for people who care only about the answer they give to the 0-10 satisfaction question, their answer is a good measure of their situation. But, while individuals can sensibly (if not wisely) be focused on their emotions, it is harder to make sense of life goals centered on the answer to the 0-10 questionnaire. A person with such a narrow goal would rather have a worse life if that came with a different calibration of his answers. Such a person would accept any form of manipulation of his judgment that would enhance his score. In the previous paragraph, the evolution of goals and standards has been described as useful in the management of emotions. People who care at least partly about their own emotions can indeed benefit from a manipulation or training of their aspirations that reduces the occurrence of feelings of disappointment and failure and increases the occurrence of feelings of elation and success. In contrast, the manipulation of one's standards for the sole purpose of changing one's answer to the 0-10 question does not seem psychologically sound. It is easy to believe that 'to be satisfied' is tautologically the goal of individuals, but that is incorrect. One can 'be satisfied' in two ways, either by living the life one wants or by a manipulation of one's judgment. Ordinary people are not indifferent between these two ways to satisfaction, showing that their goal is not 'to be satisfied' simpliciter.
In conclusion, a greater score on the 0-10 ladder is not a reliable proxy for greater well-being. More relevantly, a stable score is not a reliable evidence for stagnation of well-being. The fact that people constantly adjust their aspirations and standards can, in fact, be taken as a proof that they do not care about the absolute score. If they did care about their satisfaction score, they would invest in keeping their low standards when their situation improved.
Respecting common values and goals
In the X example, the measure that is most respectful of people's concerns and values is, simply, X itself (or any ordinally equivalent index). Someone with greater X has a better life, and everyone agrees with this evaluation. This person may have a lower score in a happiness measure or a satisfaction question, but this is not what people, in the example, care about. They care about X. If their achievement in X doubles over half a century, this is a great success even if their feelings remain similar because they are psychologically healthy, and their satisfaction answers do not show any significant increase due to shifting standards.
That an objective measure may be the most respectful of people's preferences and values may seem paradoxical, but it is not. The fact that X is the good measure cannot be found out without inspecting people's values. If they cared about another magnitude Y, another measure would be preferable. There is an essential element of subjectivity in the information that X is what people care about. Once this is known, however, respecting their values imposes looking at the same objective magnitude they themselves focus on in their lives.
This remark deflects the typical objection of the advocates of subjective indexes. They claim that taking any other measure ignores people's own perspective on life and implies that 'we play God and decide what is good for others, even if they will never feel it to be so' (Layard, 2005: 121) . The contrary is true. Adopting a subjective index when people care about objective achievements betrays their own concerns. The only consistent defense of subjective indexes in this context is to say that people are mistaken and should care solely about their mental states, be they feelings or judgments. 15 One can indeed sensibly argue that modern culture is too materialistic and that people should be encouraged to think more about their feelings. But this is not the topic of this article, in which the question is how one should proceed in order to respect people's values. It is a matter of fact that subjective well-being indexes are perfectionist if they do not coincide with the concerns and values of people in life.
It is easy to believe otherwise because, first, knowing people's values and goals requires subjective information and, second, subjective indexes have a link with people's preferences in the various ways explained above. But once one understands that feelings at best reflect changes in what people care about while both feelings and judgments suffer from a calibration problem, there is nothing mysterious about a possible discrepancy between a subjective index and the actual life evaluations of individuals.
The complexity of life and disagreements
The real world is not like the example in which people care only about a single magnitude X. People, in fact, do care about a multiplicity of things. Moreover, they give different weights to different dimensions because they have different goals and values. If one accepts that X is a good measure of individual well-being in the example, how can one extend the approach to such a complex world?
Complexity is better tackled by steps. Let us first consider an intermediate world in which there are multiple dimensions that people care about, but in which people share the same values and goals, and therefore give the same weights to the various aspects of life. If one wants to respect their goals, it is still possible to construct something like X. Let U(x) be an index that evaluates the contents of a life, as described by a vector x, according to their common preference ordering. That is, U(x 0 ) > U(x) means that life x 0 is considered better than life x. The magnitude U(x) shares the properties that X had in the 424 Politics, Philosophy & Economics 11 (4) simple example. Everyone in this particular population agrees that a greater U(x) represents a better life. Of course, there are an infinite number of possible U indexes that do just as well in this respect. This was already true in the X example. While I insisted that X was the best index, any other increasing transform f(X) would have done just as well, provided that the same transform is used in the evaluation of every member of the population. Note that using such a transform need not influence the evaluation of social distributions. If a good social criterion relies on a social welfare function W(X 1 , ... , X n ), the same criterion can be represented by another social welfare function W 0 (f(X 1 ), ... , f(X n )), for a suitable function W 0 . Let us now consider the more complex and realistic configuration in which people have different values and goals in their lives. There are two principles that may be inspired by the analysis done in the simpler cases. The first principle is that for the comparison of individuals sharing the same orderings over possible lives, the index of wellbeing should agree with their common evaluation of their own situations. Formally, if there is a group of individuals for whom U(x) represents their common ordering of lives, a good index should declare a member of this group better off with life x 0 than any other member of the group (or herself) with life x if U(x 0 ) > U(x). Let this principle be called the same-preference principle.
Another principle is the dominance principle, saying that if everyone in the population prefers life x 0 to life x, then any member of society with x 0 should be declared better off than any other member (or herself) with life x. This is identical to the 'intersection principle' proposed by Sen (1985 Sen ( , 1992 for interpersonal comparisons of capabilities. In the context of comparing capabilities, Sen (1992: 46 ff.) argues that when one individual has more than another in every dimension of capability, there is no ambiguity that his situation is better (this is what he calls the 'dominance partial order'), and that even when an individual does not have more in every dimension, his situation is unambiguously better when all relevant weighting systems declare his situation to be better, which is the intersection principle. One can read Sen as suggesting that the intersection ordering is the least incomplete ordering that can be safely proposed for interpersonal comparisons of capabilities.
In the X example, X itself, viewed as an index of well-being, satisfies both principles. In the extended example in which all people share the same ordering U, the U(x) index also satisfies both principles. It may be worth stressing here, in passing, that an ordinary subjective index would not satisfy any of these two principles in general. In particular, a satisfaction index may be lower or equal for an individual with greater X or greater U(x) than another individual (because of a different calibration), which contradicts both principles.
Unfortunately, when people can have different orderings, the two principles become incompatible with one another. 16 As a matter of fact, dominance clashes not only with the same-preference principle, but also with a very basic principle of sovereignty that is weaker than the same-preference principle. This basic sovereignty principle requires the evaluation to agree with an individual's preferences when two lives are compared for this particular individual. Unlike the same-preference principle, this basic principle of sovereignty only compares different situations for the same individual at a time. 17 Fleurbaey 425 Consider four lives x, x 0 , y, and y 0 . Assume that individual i strongly prefers x and x 0 to y and y 0 , individual j strongly prefers y and y 0 to x and x 0 , and x 0 is slightly better than x in all respects while y 0 is slightly better than y in all respects. That is, everyone in society prefers x 0 to x and y 0 to y. This configuration has nothing exceptional to it and is bound to occur whenever individuals have different orderings.
The basic principle of individual sovereignty implies that individual i is better off with x or x 0 than with y or y 0 , whereas individual j is better off with y or y 0 than with x or x 0 . The dominance principle implies that any individual is better off with x 0 than any individual with x, and any individual is better off with y 0 than any individual with y. But this generates a cycle: i with y 0 is better off than j with y (by dominance), who is better off than j with x 0 (by sovereignty), who is better off than i with x (by dominance), who is better off than i with y 0 (by sovereignty). This shows that dominance is incompatible with the basic sovereignty principle, and therefore with the same-preference principle as well.
The incompatibility between the two principles requires dropping or at least weakening one of them. Keeping the dominance principle would leave individual values with very little influence on the evaluation of individual well-being. It really seems to show minimal respect for individual preferences to respect them in the comparison of different lives for the same individual. While the dominance principle has a lot of intuitive attraction, it is in fact not so difficult to dispel it. The principle was formulated above in terms of strict preference. A variant of it implies that two individuals with the same life x should be deemed equally well off, independently of their preferences, because everyone in the population is indifferent between x and x. This is immediately unappealing. When individuals have identical lives, but different values, it should be possible to say that one is better off because his life fits his preferences better. This is impossible under the dominance principle.
It is intuitive that an individual with a life fitting her values may be better off than another whose life may be slightly better in all respects, except that it is at odds with her own values. A successful banker may be better off than an even more successful banker if the latter would rather be an artist. The dominance principle imposes an ignoring of personal preferences over one's own situation, and this seems exactly contrary to what this article is about. In the simpler contexts of the X and U examples, the dominance principle was satisfied only because of the uniformity of goals in the population. As soon as a diversity of values is allowed, the principle loses its attractiveness.
The attraction of the dominance principle probably comes from the impression that when there is unanimity about the fact that x 0 is better than x, this seems a robust judgment. Actually, it seems even more robust when there is a diversity of preferences, because the dominance principle then appears to capture the core of the population's values. This is, however, deceptive. What needs to be compared and ranked is not a set of possible lives (x, x 0 , and so on), but a set of individual situations, each situation being the combination of a life and a value-laden perspective on this life, that is, the individual's own evaluation of her life among other possible lives. When all individuals share the same values, this second element can be bracketed out because it is the same for the individual situations to be assessed. When there is a diversity of values, however, the problem is quite different. Even if everyone prefers a more successful life as a banker to a less successful life as a banker, it is not obvious that a more successful life as a banker makes an artistically oriented person better off than a less successful life as a banker for a born banker. The fit between values and the contents of one's life is an important element that disappears in the dominance principle.
The equivalence approach
If the dominance principle is completely abandoned, there are a host of possible measures of well-being satisfying the same-preference principle. They all share the property that they espouse individuals' orderings whenever they are used to compare situations in which the preferences of the individuals concerned are the same. Concretely, if we are talking of a numerical measure of well-being, this means that for every individual ordering R of possible lives, there is a function U R that represents that ordering 18 and coincides with the measure when the measure is applied to an individual whose values induce this particular ordering. That is, if the measure is called M, the value of M is U R (x) for an individual with preference ordering R and life x. In this way, the value of M automatically respects the ranking of situations by individuals sharing the same ordering R.
A limitation of the same-preference principle is that it imposes no restriction whatsoever on the comparison of individual situations involving different preference orderings. That is, it imposes no link between the U R functions corresponding to different R's. It is even compatible with a kind of perfectionism that would rank preference orderings first and look at the contents of life only afterwards. For instance, it is compatible with the judgment that any life associated with artistic goals is better than any life associated with financial goals. Although this particular example is perhaps not repugnant to intellectuals, the general idea that individual lives could matter less than individual values is troubling. This is the opposite extreme to what the dominance principle implied.
If one wants to retain a concern for the contents of life, there are several possibilities, some of which remain to be explored and understood better. There may even be some that remain to be imagined. This is an intriguing field of research. Two approaches will be described here.
The approach that is the best understood is the equivalence approach. It has the interesting property that it satisfies a restricted form of the dominance principle. Specifically, it satisfies the dominance principle only for pairs of lives x and x 0 that belong to a subset of possible lives. In order to make things simple in this presentation of the approach, it is convenient to take the example of lives having two dimensions, for example, income and health. It is assumed that individuals prefer to have more income and better health. Suppose that the dominance principle is restricted to lives displaying good health, and therefore says that a healthy life with more income is better than another healthy life, but says nothing about lives involving health problems.
If this is combined with the basic sovereignty principle (or the stronger samepreference principle), only one type of measure of individual well-being is possible. Indeed, assume that, for every individual situation, there is a level of income that, combined with good health, would yield a life that is deemed as good as her actual situation by the individual concerned. 19 This level of income, which is typically lower than actual income because good health may justify a sacrifice on income, may be called the Fleurbaey'healthy-equivalent income'. 20 For every individual, it would then be a matter of indifference to change her life x into a healthy life x* with a healthy-equivalent income. But in a society in which everyone is healthy, the restricted dominance principle applies and imposes ranking individual situations in terms of income. That is, healthy lives x* can and must be compared directly in terms of income. As the basic sovereignty principle requires evaluating the lives x in the same way as the equivalent healthy lives x*, one sees that a life will be considered better than another as a function of how their healthy-equivalent incomes compare. In other words, healthy-equivalent income, or an increasing transform of it, is the proper measure of individual well-being.
It is a general result that combining the basic sovereignty principle with the dominance principle restricted to a subset of lives imposes a measure of well-being that takes this 'equivalence' form (see Decancq et al., 2009) . What the result does not say is what subset of lives is suitable for the application of the dominance principle. In the incomehealth example, good health is a convenient and rather natural reference, but is not the only possible one. The selection of a good reference will not be addressed here in detail, except to mention that there is no reason to be pessimistic and to believe that the choice of the reference has to be arbitrary. Rather, it is an ethical choice. For instance, one way to think about it is to observe that the reference has the special property that objective comparisons can be made without consideration of individual preferences. In the income-health example, situations of good health can be compared in terms of income, independently of the preferences of the individuals concerned. Therefore, a good reference must be such that preferences do not appear relevant when one wants to compare individuals whose lives belong to the reference subset. 21 It is probably not necessary to emphasize that the equivalence approach works fine in the X and U examples, and is therefore really an extension of the measures that were advocated for these examples.
The Borda approach
An alternative approach consists in evaluating individual situations by counting the number of possible lives that are less good for the individual concerned than her current life. This is inspired by the Borda voting rule, which gives every candidate a score equal to the sum of individual Borda utilities for this candidate, the Borda utility being defined as the number of candidates ranked below the candidate under consideration in the voter's preference ordering. A well-known advantage of the Borda rule over other rules based on majority voting is that it takes account of the part of the intensity of preferences that is contained in the voters' rankings. For a majority-based rule, it does not matter whether a voter votes for A against B because A is her best candidate and B is the worst or because she has a slight preference for A and B is just adjacent to it in her ranking. For the Borda rule, her preference for A counts much more in the former case than in the latter. 22 Counting the options that one deems inferior to a contemplated option is a way to represent individual preferences, because the better an option, the more options are below it in the preference ordering. In the voting context with a finite number of candidates, this works well. In the richer context of life evaluation, it may happen that there are an infinite number of lives below a certain life in an individual's ranking. In this case, some form of integration can be used in order to perform an operation that is similar to 'counting' the number of inferior lives. The integration may be weighted if one wants to give more importance to some particular sorts of lives. 23 The Borda approach overlaps with the equivalence approach, in fact, because they coincide when all the weight in the former is put on the reference situations that are used in the latter. That is, instead of 'counting' all the lives below a particular life, one may count all the reference lives (for example, lives with good health in the income-health example). This yields a measure of well-being that is ordinally equivalent to the measure obtained with the equivalence approach.
The same-preference principle is satisfied by any measure from the Borda approach, because a better life in a given preference ordering always has more lives below. Like the equivalence approach, the Borda approach is incompatible with an evaluation of individual situations that would give most of the weight to the values of the individual rather than to the contents of her life. It is, however, less well understood than the equivalence approach. It has an interesting property that the equivalence approach does not have. Namely, when preferences change to the advantage of the current situation, which means that more lives than before are now considered inferior to the current situation, the Borda approach always records the improvement, whereas the equivalence approach does not and may give the same value to the initial and the final situations (for instance, when the current life is a reference situation such as a life with good health in the income-health example, the evaluation of such a life by healthy-equivalent income is then impervious to preferences).
In contrast, the Borda approach generally does not satisfy the dominance principle on any subset of possible lives. The exception is when the Borda approach coincides with the equivalence approach and therefore satisfies the dominance principle restricted to a reference subset of lives. But when the Borda approach does not put all the weighting on a reference subset of lives, typically, for every life, there is another life that is better in all respects, but gives a lower Borda evaluation if it is associated with individual preferences for which this life is a less good fit than the preferences associated with the other life. Therefore, one can perhaps say that the Borda approach is more sensitive to the fit between preferences and the contents of life than the equivalence approach. But it is hard to make such a statement rigorous.
Needless to say, the Borda approach works fine in the X and U examples, and is, like the equivalence approach, a true extension of the measures proposed in these simpler cases.
In summary, the equivalence approach and the Borda approach appear as reasonable extensions of the X measure for the case in which life has multiple dimensions and individuals may have diverging values and priorities. They accommodate subjective aspects of well-being in two ways. First, in virtue of the same-preference principle they respect the comparisons the individuals themselves make about their own possible lives (basic sovereignty principle) and across persons having the same values. It worth noting here that although the same-preference principle may appear restrictive because it applies only to individuals sharing exactly the same ordering of possible lives, the two measures proposed here are such that for individuals who have similar (though not identical) orderings, it is often the case that when these individuals agree about how to rank two possible Fleurbaeylives, the measure concurs. It is only when two individuals have widely diverging preferences that it may more easily occur that they both consider that one of their own lives is better than the other although the proposed measure concludes otherwise.
The second way in which subjectivity is taken into account in the approach is that mental states, in particular emotions, may appear in the goals of individuals, and there is no difficulty in making room for them in the list of dimensions of life. The proposed measures will respect the relative priority that individuals give to their own mental states alongside other, more objective, features of their lives. Even those individuals who care only about certain mental states may be incorporated in the analysis. Moreover, by the same-preference principle, the evaluation of the relative situations of a subgroup of individuals who care only about certain mental states and in exactly the same way will coincide with the subjective index of such mental states. In other words, the equivalence approach and the Borda approach can be viewed as generalizations of happiness indexes, generalizations that allow for a variety of individual priorities, including about subjective states. 24 Obviously, they can also be viewed as generalizations of objective indexes such as indexes of capabilities for exactly the same reason: they are equivalent to an index of capabilities for the subpopulation of individuals who care about their capabilities in exactly the way described by the index.
Self-centered or general preferences?
The previous sections have dealt with the opposition between subjective and objective indicators, and shown that respecting people's values generally requires comprehensive indexes of well-being that take account of objective and subjective states jointly. In this section and the next one, another issue will be examined, which has also raised perplexity in the field of welfare evaluation. Insofar as individual preferences are taken into account, should we restrict attention to self-centered preferences or allow for preferences about the distribution of advantages in society?
In economics, a long tradition has been comfortable with assuming that individuals are selfish and care only about their personal situation, independently of what happens to others, except perhaps their family. This assumption is not realistic and the studies of subjective well-being have confirmed that individuals appear to care about their relative situation . 25 There are, however, several ways in which relative considerations may be rendered compatible with the selfishness assumption.
First, as explained in the previous sections, individuals may compare themselves to others when they calibrate their answers to satisfaction surveys. They may, for instance, consider that the average or modal situation they see around them deserves a grade of 5 in the 0-10 ladder, and give their own life a grade that reflects how far, above or below, they see themselves from the average or mode. In this fashion, their answer depends on the situation of others in a way that does not appear benevolent. An increase in the situation of others around them raises their standards and depresses their evaluation of their own life. But this calibration effect may have nothing to do with caring about what happens to others, or even caring about one's relative position. It is possible to have selfish preferences and use the situation of others only as a benchmark for the special context of 430 Politics, Philosophy & Economics 11 (4) answering a questionnaire about satisfaction. One cannot deduce from a negative influence of the situation of others on satisfaction questions that people are malevolent or envious. Second, individuals may care only about their own situation, but consider that certain positional goods are relevant parts of the description of their situation. In particular, social status is something that is eminently relative, but is also in a clear sense a purely personal characteristic, unlike one's rank in the distribution of income. One may be happy to have a job that attracts prestige or respect without caring about anything else than such characteristics of one's own situation which are, in a given culture, almost objective.
Whether individuals do genuinely care about their relative position in a strongly relative sense or whether they are intrinsically concerned by the situation of others cannot therefore be easily checked with ordinary surveys. There are more interesting specific studies (in particular, Benjamin et al., 2010; Tversky and Griffin, 1991 ) that present respondents with a trade-off between absolute success and relative success (that is, choosing between a relatively well-paid job and a relatively badly paid job that pays more in absolute terms). The results of such studies suggest that when they make a choice people are more interested in their absolute outcome even when they forecast that their subjective well-being will depend on their relative outcome and would favor the opposite choice. But these studies also show that there is a diversity of responses and that a significant fraction of the respondents are driven in their choice by the relative considerations.
In welfare economics, another motivation for restricting attention to self-centered preferences, independently of whether individuals are actually selfish or not, has been the fear of giving an advantage to the selfish or malevolent to the detriment of the altruist. The archetypal example is that of altruist Abel who cares about the welfare of an envious Cain who cares about his relative situation and therefore prefers that Abel's situation be as bad as possible, other things equal. If a social evaluation is made with the sum-utilitarian criterion, Abel will count for less than one, whereas Cain will count for more than one. Some authors, such as Harsanyi (1982: 56) , have advocated ignoring the negative feelings, but respecting the benevolent feelings. This would reduce, but not eliminate the apparent unfairness between Abel and Cain, because Abel would then count for one, but Cain would still count for more than one thanks to Abel's concern for him. If one wants to restore equality of weights in the social evaluation, it seems that the most efficient solution is to eliminate all not strictly personal preferences from the computation. 26 It must be noted in passing that the problem is more serious for utilitarianism than for a social criterion that gives priority to the worst off. Consider, for instance, the maximin criterion, which gives absolute priority to the worst off. If equality of comprehensive utilities (that include personal and impersonal preferences) is achieved in a situation in which personal utilities are equal, then the presence of impersonal preferences does not necessarily generate an advantage for the malevolent or a disadvantage for the altruist. Indeed, if the situation is efficient as regards personal utilities, it is impossible to raise the personal utility of one of them without decreasing the other's. Now, raising the malevolent's personal utility and decreasing the altruist's personal utility should increase Fleurbaey 431 both individuals' comprehensive utility such that the maximin criterion considers this to be an improvement of the social distribution. This phenomenon would require very strongly altruist preferences on behalf of the one whose personal utility is diminished.
Moving the cut between personal and impersonal
Empirical studies of satisfaction with life ask respondents about their own life, not about their satisfaction with everything in society or the world. Therefore, respondents who care a lot about general societal issues will not be able to convey their concerns with such issues. On the other hand, respondents who do care a lot about how their achievements compare to those of others, and not just their own absolute achievements, will certainly incorporate their preferences about their relative position into their answers. Several authors (for example, Frank, 1985; Layard, 2005) consider it important to address the negative externalities induced by such preferences about relative positions, for instance by taxing income that is earned to keep up with the Joneses. We will examine here what happens to interpersonal comparisons if instead of restricting attention to strictly personal preferences, one extends the scope of relevant preferences to include preferences over one's relative position. The distinction to be made is then no longer the traditional distinction between self-centered preferences and impersonal preferences, but, instead, between preferences over one's own absolute and relative situation, on the one hand, and preferences over the situation of others, on the other hand. This moves the boundary so as to incorporate into the self part some aspects of comparisons with others.
Before doing so, let us examine if such a broader scope of preferences can be justified on a normative basis, if one wants to use the measurement of well-being for social evaluation. One can defend this new separation between self-regarding and other-regarding preferences by arguing that there is a sense in which one's relative position is still a characteristic of one's own situation, even if it directly depends on the distribution of well-being in the rest of society. It may be part of a personal life plan to be at a certain position in a ranking, and this may concern ordinary people, not just professional athletes. In particular, there seems to be nothing pathological when individuals resent their low position in the distribution and consider that it undermines their dignity. Rawls, for instance, did accept legitimate forms of resentment induced by inequalities, while at the same time rejecting feelings of envy as irrelevant for social evaluation. It is proposed here to accept all aspects of one's relative position as possibly relevant objects of personal preferences.
One may, however, wonder why the scope of relevant preferences could not be extended further and cover all sorts of other-regarding preferences. For instance, Riley (forthcoming) recalls that for J.S. Mill the sentiment of justice and social unity is the highest quality pleasure and therefore the most important part of true individual happiness. 27 From a different, egalitarian perspective, Dworkin (2000) argues that it is really in every individual's interest to live in a fair society.
When all other-regarding preferences are incorporated, however, the evaluation of social states becomes obviously problematic. Consider someone whose paramount goal is the extermination of a particular minority. Such a person would be considered to be 432 Politics, Philosophy & Economics 11(4) very badly off when this goal is not pursued in his society. Alternatively, consider the case of someone who is lucky in having many relatives who care greatly for him (more than they care for themselves). It would be sufficient to make this person well off to raise the well-being of the whole group, and this again does not seem right. Moreover, one can argue that taking all impersonal preferences into account in the measurement of individual well-being makes such measurement unsuitable for social evaluation because it blurs the distinction between social aggregation and individual well-being. Social evaluation is not a mere aggregation of people's views on society. It is a judgment formulated on the basis of principles. Incorporating political preferences in the measure of individual well-being conflates two steps of a democratic evaluation. The first step is the elaboration of consistent views of a good society and consistent measures of individual and social welfare. The second step is the confrontation of such views and the final selection of a leading view by a democratic process of deliberation and decision. One should not seek to take account of the individuals' diverse and therefore collectively inconsistent political views in the first step. They will be voiced and pushed in the second step.
There are serious difficulties in precisely delineating when a concern for one's relative position can be legitimately recorded or not. It appears acceptable to count as a genuine disadvantage the low relative position of someone who cares about being in the middle of the distribution. It would be hard to record as a disadvantage the disappointment of a white person who cannot accept that some black people are better off than he is or of a man who cannot accept having a female superior in his job. One's relative position in society may be a legitimate concern, but one's relative position with respect to specific groups seems not to be so. One way to make sense of the distinction is to say that one's relative position in society is a characteristic of the individual situation, whereas caring about one's relative position with respect to a specific group involves a political preference about the situation of this group in society. According to the view discussed here, such political attitudes must be excluded from the measure of individual well-being.
Let us now address the main point of this section. What happens to the measurement of well-being according to the equivalence approach, or the Borda approach, if relative achievements are taken to be legitimate objects of individual preferences along with absolute achievements? Do we run a risk, to the detriment of the benevolent, of giving a bonus to the malevolent? First, it must be noted that the new boundary does almost the contrary to what Harsanyi suggested. Someone who altruistically cares about the good fate of others will not see this as counting in the measurement of her well-being. Indeed, the fate of others is not, by itself, part of her absolute or relative situation. In contrast, the apparent malevolent who cares about his relative ranking and therefore suffers a harm when the success of others pushes him down the social ladder, will have this counted as a real harm. However, and more in line with Harsanyi, the pure malevolent who desires the failure of other people independently of his own relative situation will not have such preferences recorded in the evaluation.
Observe that in order to be apparently altruistic through one's preference over one's own relative position, one must wish to be as low as possible in the ranking, other things equal -a rather unusual form of preference. What is more plausible is to wish to be somewhere in the middle of the distribution, implying that one is apparently malevolent when one is badly ranked and apparently benevolent when one is highly ranked.
At any rate, let us imagine a society in which no one wishes to be in the lower tail of the distribution, some desire to be in the middle, while others seek to be at the top. Consider an application of the equivalence approach in a simple two-dimensional context featuring absolute income and relative income (for example, the ratio of one's income to average income). A graphical analysis illustrating the arguments of this section is presented in the Appendix.
In this context, individuals would care at most about these two aspects of their situation. A natural way to proceed is to fix a reference value of relative income that serves in the computation of an equivalent absolute income. In other words, one's equivalent income is the level of income that, combined with the reference level of relative income, one would deem just as good as one's actual situation.
Suppose that a middle relative income (that is, an income equal to average income) is taken as the reference. An individual whose income is below the average is then considered to be doubly disadvantaged: first, because of a low income and, second, because of a low relative income. This is something nobody, by assumption, desires. An individual whose income is above the average is considered to be doubly advantaged if he belongs to the category of those who wish to be near the top. In contrast, those who desire to be in the middle are less advantaged than their absolute position suggests. In conclusion, there is no doubt that incorporating preferences about one's relative rank in the measure of wellbeing does not substantially reduce the pressure to reduce inequalities. Although a reduction of the gap between the rich and the poor may occur (see Appendix Figure A5c ), the situation of the poor appears worse than when evaluated by their absolute income only.
Could it be different with a different reference for relative income? With a low reference, the individuals with low income will no longer be doubly disadvantaged, but those above the average will be more than doubly advantaged if they seek a high rank and will no longer be disadvantaged by their relative position if they seek a middle rank. With a high reference, the individuals with low income will be doubly disadvantaged if they desire a high rank, whereas those with a preference for a middle rank will not be disadvantaged by their relative position. The individuals with high income then have an equivalent income close to their actual income.
Under the assumptions made here, it never happens that the individuals with low income are considered to be advantaged by their relative income. The rich may suffer a disadvantage only when they would prefer to be in the middle of the distribution. Therefore, there does not seem to be a serious danger that the extended preferences would require an overhaul of the distributional analysis.
With the Borda approach, a similar reasoning leads to the conclusion that inequalities never operate to the advantage of the poor and that they are to the detriment of the rich only when the rich would strongly prefer to be in the middle of the distribution. In conclusion, there is no reason to be afraid of a reduction of the pressure for inequality reduction after the incorporation of relative achievements in the list of objects of individual preferences, provided that one adopts an approach respecting people's wishes to be either well positioned or in the middle of the distribution, such as the equivalent approach or the Borda approach.
There may be more troubling consequences. For instance, among the poor the worst off are those who care not only about their absolute situation, but also about their relative situation. Do they deserve a special priority in social policy? This is not really a practical question, because it is probably impossible to elicit such preferences in an incentivecompatible way and with sufficient precision to be able to target the relevant social subgroups accordingly. One could imagine, however, that isolated individuals are less concerned about their relative ranking than those who live next to affluent classes. This would then suggest that the urban poor deserve more urgent help than the rural poor at the same level of absolute income. It is not clear, however, that there is anything repugnant to this conclusion.
Another paradox is that, among the rich, the most advantaged are those who seek the top positions. Redistribution should therefore tax them more heavily, if that were possible, than those who would rather be in the middle range. This is not, however, a very disturbing paradox as, after all, the latter can easily go down the income ladder by making charitable donations or by changing jobs if they wish.
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Ex ante or ex post?
Another fascinating debate in welfare economics deals with individual attitudes about risk. How should one take account of them in the evaluation of social situations that imply various amounts and distributions of risk? Here again, the point will be that the most natural approach is not necessarily the best.
The most natural approach consists in measuring individual well-being in terms of expected utility. There is a difficulty due to the fact that individuals often fail to be expected-utility maximizers, and interesting alternative theories of decision-making, such as prospect theory, have been devised in order to improve the capturing of what drives individual choices of risky options. In the normative context of evaluation, however, one may hesitate about adopting individuals' actual decision criteria when they fail basic principles of rationality. Even if individuals are not expected-utility maximizers, perhaps the best account of their well-being should take the form of an expected value. This is not an easy issue and let us put it aside here, by simply assuming that individuals are expected-utility maximizers. Even under this simplifying assumption, a key problem remains.
Suppose that the measure of individual well-being is some form of expected utility and we adopt a degree of priority for the worse off in social evaluation. Then two problems arise with this approach.
First, the social evaluation itself is irrational. Consider a safe option that guarantees a good level of well-being equally distributed among the population and a risky option that provides a slightly greater level of expected well-being to everyone than the safe option, but produces large inequalities in every possible state of the world. For an evaluation criterion that relies on expected well-being, the risky option is better because it offers a greater level of expected well-being to every individual in the population. But the same evaluation criterion, considering each possible final consequence, must also declare that a worse social distribution will eventually be obtained with the risky option if the inequalities it generates are large enough. In other words, the criterion is committed Fleurbaey 435 to saying that an option may be better than another even when it is bound to produce a worst outcome. Because of such violation of a basic principle of rationality, some authors prefer an 'ex post' approach that applies the expected-value approach at the social level rather than at the individual level. In addition, Harsanyi (1955) provided a famous theorem stating that if one wants to apply expected utility both at the individual and at the social level (while respecting individual preferences about the risky alternatives), the social criterion must take the form of a weighted sum of individual utilities, therefore excluding a priority for the worse off.
There is, however, a second problem with measuring individual well-being as an expected value that is more relevant to this article. What do individuals care about? Do they care about the final outcome or about their expected utility? This may seem a strange question because a rational individual decision-maker, under risk, may at the same time care about the final consequences and rely on expected utility as the best way to do so.
But in the context of social evaluation, things may be different. Consider again the example in which the risky option produces inequalities in each state of the world. This means that there will always be some individuals who will be worse off than with the safe option. The evaluator does not know who these individuals will be, because they are not the same in every state (which is how their expected utility can be high with the risky option). Nonetheless, the evaluator is sure that some individuals will suffer a loss if the risky option is taken, and that this loss is sufficient to make the distribution worse.
The most striking version of this example is when the final distribution is known for sure in the risky option, and it is only the identity of the individuals at different positions of the distribution that is not known. In this case, there is no relevant uncertainty for an impartial evaluator. The risky option is then not really risky, it is just an option with a fixed degree of inequality.
Suppose that, realizing that there is no relevant uncertainty for social evaluation, the evaluator proceeds by comparing the two distributions, the equal and the unequal, and declares the equal distribution, and therefore the safe option, to be preferable. Can individuals complain that this evaluation ignored their ex ante preference for the risky option? This is a questionable complaint if the individuals care only about their final well-being. The evaluator did record their final well-being in the computation and did not omit any relevant information in this respect. It seems that individuals should realize that their final well-being was taken into account and that the negative correlation between their personal fates made it possible to make a decision with no relevant uncertainty.
At the individual level, the best way to evaluate final well-being is to take an expected value. But when the social distribution of well-being is known, this is valuable information that should not be discarded. An 'ex ante' criterion that relies on the distribution of individual expected well-being ignores the correlation between individual payoffs and therefore fails to see when the final distribution of well-being is actually known with certainty. If individuals care only about their final well-being, it appears deeply problematic for a social criterion to discard information about the distribution of what they care about most.
436
Politics, Philosophy & Economics 11(4) Whether individuals care about their final well-being or about their expected wellbeing may be considered a matter of preferences. At first glance, one might think that it is a matter of rationality to worry only about the true state of the world, and therefore about the final consequence, but this is unwarranted. An individual may care about what could have happened in counterfactual states. Moreover, even if individuals care only about their final well-being, this may be strongly influenced by their expected wellbeing if the latter has substantial emotional impact. For instance, the anxiety of developing a cancer late in life may dampen the final well-being even of the lucky ones who have excellent health until the end.
An evaluator facing a population who care only about their expected well-being can adopt an 'ex ante' perspective without fear of being irrational, because the underlying methodology is still 'ex post'. Indeed, the evaluation of the final distribution in every state of the world is also made, in this case, in terms of expected well-being, which is how individuals want their situation to be evaluated.
In summary, one can argue that the 'ex post' approach is not only the rational way to perform the evaluation of risky social options, but also the proper way to respect individuals' preferences about the relative importance of chances and final outcomes in their conception of the good life. If they care only about their chances, the 'ex post' approach will make the same decisions as an 'ex ante' criterion, but for different reasons, because final consequences for individuals will be assessed in terms of expected utilities. If individuals care only about their final fate, the 'ex post' approach is different from an 'ex ante' criterion, but can claim that it is more, not less, respectful of individual preferences.
This section has only addressed some of the possible cases and has not developed a full criterion for the evaluation of risk at the social level. It is, in particular, quite interesting to study how to respect individual preferences when the correlation of individual payoffs varies. 29 The point, here, was the limited remark that, in terms of respect for individual preferences, the 'ex ante' approach may be worse than the 'ex post' approach, contrary to what a superficial examination of the issue would suggest.
How this reflects on the use of subjective data is not obvious, because it depends on how they involve people's expectations for the future or whether they mostly refer to their present situation. Insofar as expectations feed subjective answers, the potential problem is that inequalities may be underestimated because the future lucky fear being unlucky and the future unlucky foster hopes. If, in contrast, people focus on their current situation when they answer questionnaires, one then obtains a description of final consequences for particular slices of life. If one seeks a view of the distribution of final consequences for lifetime achievements, more work is needed because neither people's assessment of their current life nor their expectations for the future provide a direct description of the desired object.
Achievements or opportunities?
Sen's capability approach can be seen as an alternative to the subjective approach and to the semi-subjective equivalent-income and Borda approaches. By focusing on the opportunities offered to individuals rather than on their actual achievements, it appears to leave room for the diversity of values and goals that may induce people to use their Fleurbaey 437 opportunities in various ways. It will be argued here, however, that whether opportunities or achievements should be recorded can be viewed as a matter of individual preference.
Whether individual situations should be evaluated in terms of achievements or opportunities is not, in general, considered a matter of individual preference. Theories of justice are viewed as having this issue under their jurisdiction. After Rawls (1982) , Dworkin (1981) , Arneson (1989) , and Cohen (1989) , it has become popular to consider that individuals should be held responsible for at least part of what happens to them, even in a perfectly egalitarian society, and to focus on their opportunities rather than their achievements. A badly off individual may have squandered good opportunities, in which case he would still be considered well off in the proper metric.
But later Arneson (1999 Arneson ( , 2000 raised a difficulty with the view that the 'currency' of egalitarian justice should be opportunities. For individuals who do not care about opportunities, but only about their own achievements, such a theory of justice would consider that their situation is improved if they are given new opportunities that they would never consider seizing. This seems at odds with the ideal of respecting individuals' values. Although it is not clear that this is of great practical importance, it is undeniable that a society that spends resources to guarantee a wide menu of opportunities to each citizen is wasteful if everyone would rather be given a narrower menu that better fits their preferences.
It may happen that people do care about opportunities as such and not just about what they ultimately make of them. In particular, wide opportunities offer the guarantee that no matter how one's preferences evolve, one can hope to find valuable options. But theories of justice do not emphasize opportunities for this reason. The idea in such theories is rather that even individuals who never cared about opportunities should have their situation evaluated not by how they fare, but by how they could have fared.
Arneson's new theory of responsibility-sensitive prioritarianism (1999) shows, however, that responsibility can be accommodated into a theory of justice without implying an exclusive focus on opportunities. In Arneson's theory, the degree of social priority assigned to an individual in a particular situation should depend on how badly off that individual is, how much she would benefit from help, and how responsible she is for her situation. The latter factor reduces social priority, but does not necessarily nullify it completely when the individual could have done well.
There is yet another approach to the responsibility issue in the context of an egalitarian or prioritarian theory of justice. It consists in giving responsibility a derivative value, not a primitive value, in the definition of a fair society. 30 In particular, one may propose to take freedom or respect for each individual's conception of the good life as the primitive value. One possible reading of the capability approach as formulated by Sen (1999) and Nussbaum (2000a Nussbaum ( , 2000b is indeed that freedom is the primitive value from which the conclusion is derived that a metric of opportunities should be used in the evaluation of individual situations. This is not, however, very convincing in view of Arneson's objection of 'pointless opportunities'. Moreover, choice is a costly activity, and it is simply not true that having a wider menu is always a good thing. Some people may prefer reduced opportunities that save them some of the worry of choosing, provided that the offered options are satisfactory for their preferences. In other words, people not only have preferences over ordinary dimensions of their lives, but also about the amount of choosing that they have to go through. Respecting their view of the good life includes taking account of their attitude toward the size of the menu. Adopting an exclusive focus on opportunities is unlikely to be respectful in general.
A more pragmatic argument in favor of opportunities is the following. It appears a matter of common sense that providing people with opportunities allows them to choose in a variety of ways, whereas monitoring their outcomes may be too imperfect and coarse in light of the diversity of preferences. There is a grain of truth in this observation, but the provision of opportunities with the objective of obtaining good outcomes cannot be used as an argument against the formulation of the social objective in terms of outcomes. Moreover, adopting a measure of well-being in terms of opportunities must not be done, in this perspective, without checking that it serves the underlying true measure involving outcomes. Even if public policies are often coarse, they may be evaluated in the light of statistical information about the distribution of individual characteristics in the population. In other words, the effects of a heavy-handed policy can be scrutinized with a very precise lens. Coarseness in policy does not require coarseness in evaluation and in the underlying social objective.
In summary, one may be uncomfortable with the principle that it is up to philosophy to decide whether people's situations should be evaluated in terms of opportunities or achievements. Why should such considerations of 'fairness' or freedom override people's wishes? It appears more attractive also to consider respecting individual views on the matter, including their diversity. Some may care a lot about having many options until very late in their life, while others are happy to face limited choices with sufficiently good options. The values of responsibility and freedom do not seem so compelling that they should override people's own perspectives on this issue. 31 Moreover, one may defend the view that the most attractive theory of responsibility and freedom would precisely focus on respecting individual preferences on the main matters of life, including this one. By giving people what they want, including as regards menu size, one grants them a more valuable form of freedom than by forcing them to have a fixed menu of formidable size. By giving them what they want, one lets them bear the consequences of their preferences and therefore assigns them a form of responsibility not in a punitive or moralistic way, but in a respectful way.
There is no difficulty in principle (although practice, of course, is another matter) to incorporate preferences over the quantity of choice in the implementation of the equivalence approach or the Borda approach. One simply has to make the quantity of choice one of the objects of individual preferences along with other dimensions of life. Therefore the idea of respecting individual perspectives on this issue is implementable with such measures of well-being.
Not everything is a matter of preferences
It has already been briefly argued in the section following the introduction that not all features of a social evaluation criterion can be derived from individual preferences. For instance, the degree of inequality aversion cannot be derived mechanically by a simple look at people's political views.
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The point of this last section is different, however. It is that not all features of the index of individual well-being can be derived from individual preferences. Individual preferences do put strong constraints on how to compare the lives of individuals sharing the same preferences. The same-preference principle tells us that if they agree about a ranking of their own lives, a good index of well-being should concur.
The comparison of individuals with different preferences is another matter. For this exercise there is no higher-order form of preferences that would tell us how to proceed. Consider the equivalence approach, for instance. It is based on the specification of a particular subset of reference situations such that individuals who enjoy such situations can be compared by the dominance principle independently of their preferences. There is nothing in individual preferences that guides us in the selection of this reference subset. Similarly, the Borda approach relies on particular weights that are assigned to the various inferior lives that are counted (or added in an integration), and there is nothing in individual preferences that can help in choosing such weights.
The specification of such weights or reference situations is not a minor issue. It has a strong impact on the comparisons of individuals with differing preferences. It may be reassuring, however, to note that both the equivalence approach and the Borda approach satisfy the following property, which can be called the 'nested contour principle': if two individuals are such that all the lives one of them considers equivalent to her own life are deemed better, by both individuals, than all the lives the other considers equivalent to his own, then the index of well-being should concur. This puts limits on the variability of evaluations of situations involving different preferences. With these approaches, the choice of reference and weighting parameters can never be so crucial as to make it possible, for every pair of individuals having different preferences, to reverse the relative evaluation of their situations simply by changing the parameters of the measure.
In conclusion, the main message of this article is that individual values, goals, priorities, and preferences can be taken into account in the measurement of individual wellbeing and the evaluation of social welfare, and, more importantly, that doing so provides useful guidelines to address classical issues about subjective well-being, impersonal preferences, opportunities, and risk. But doing so implies that the measurement of wellbeing should not follow the usual routes that look at expressions of satisfaction or at opportunities. There are better measures, and the shortest way to characterize them, perhaps, is that they perform interpersonal comparisons directly in the space of the objects that are at the center of people's concerns in their lives. This is to be contrasted with a subjective index which relies on an external scale. The heterogeneity of such scales across people makes it unreliable for interpersonal comparisons. In a different vein, an index of capabilities focuses on the menu, whereas people often care about the option that is enjoyed. What is argued here is that if people care about something, one should instead compare them in the terms in which the object of their concern is measured. Satisfaction indicators and indexes of opportunities may be interesting proxies in some cases, but they are too remote from the object of people's concerns to be reliable in all cases. The measures proposed in this article provide 'a more direct assessment of the final outcome about which people are most concerned' (Kahneman et al., 1999: xi-xii) .
Consider a population of n individuals, the distribution of income being described by the vector (x 1 , ..., x n ). Let x denote the average income. Individual i's preferences are assumed to bear on the pair (x i , x i / x). Letting r i ¼ x i / x and x Ài ¼ P j≠i x j one has x i ¼ r i x -i /(n -r i ). This means that the possible points (x i , r i ) for i, given x -i , are located on the curve displayed in Figure A1 .
When x -i moves up or down, the curve is rescaled vertically and spans the whole area between the vertical axis and the vertical line at n. Therefore individual preferences are defined on this area. An individual who does not care about his relative position has flat indifference curves (see Figure A2a) ; an individual who wants to be at the top has negatively sloped indifference curves (see Figure A2b) ; and an individual who wants to be middle ranked has U-shaped indifference curves (see Figure A2c ) (the trough is at 1, which corresponds to the case n ¼ 2). Now consider the evaluation of individual well-being with the equivalence approach. If the reference relative income is low, one obtains the equivalent incomes identified in Figure A3 for a rich and a poor person, depending on their preferences. The bracket on the vertical axis highlights the difference in equivalent incomes between the two individuals. When the rich person prefers to be at the top, the inequality in equivalent incomes is greater than the inequality in ordinary incomes. Figure A4 does the same exercise for a high reference, and Figure A5 for a middle reference. Figure A6 shows the difference in the areas below the two indifference curves, that is, the difference between the Borda measures if they are computed by ordinary areas (without special weighting of some parts of the space). believe that justice is defined by a mechanical maximization of happiness -which would indeed be circular if happiness itself depends on justice being realized. 28. Someone whose ideal relative rank, for a given absolute income, is in the middle of the distribution would spontaneously choose a rank above the middle. Indeed, starting from the middle, increasing one's income raises one's absolute income, which is a first-order improvement, whereas the deterioration due to moving away from one's favored relative rank is only second order. 29. See Fleurbaey (2010) for a proposal along these lines. 30. This is defended, for instance, by Scheffler (2005) , who criticizes the moralistic turn taken by egalitarian theories of justice. 31. A perfectionist defense of a minimum amount of freedom and autonomy is, however, possible.
Some of the arguments of this section are developed in more detail in Fleurbaey (2008 Fleurbaey ( , 2011a .
